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It is a common belief that the rise of standardized software certification schemes like the Common
Criteria (CC) would give a boost to formal verification, and that software certification may be a killer
application for program verification. However, while formal models are indeed used throughout
high-assurance certification, verification of the actual implementation is not required by the CC and
largely neglected in certification practice – despite the great advances in program verification over
the last decade.
In this paper we discuss the gap between program verification and CC software certification, and
we point out possible uses of code-level program verification in the CC certification process.
1 Introduction
Software certification is commonly seen as a powerful means to achieve high-quality software – par-
ticularly if it is employed in a security-critical context. The Common Criteria (CC) [5] are a widely
recognized international standard for computer security, which has also attracted the interest of formal
methods researchers over the last years. As the CC clearly prescribe the usage of formal methods at their
highest assurance levels, this is seen by many as an opportunity to bring formal software verification
to a broader audience. Many believe that software certification may indeed be a killer application for
program verification.
However, while formal models are indeed used throughout high-assurance certification and it is
mandatory to employ functional tests, verification of the actual implementation at code-level is not re-
quired by the CC and largely neglected in certification practice.
At the same time, the CC are being criticized by practitioners: The The CC were too costly, produced
too much paperwork, and adhered to a legacy process model.
In this paper we discuss the gap between program verification and CC software certification, and we
point out possible uses of code-level program verification in the CC certification process.
After reviewing the basics of software certification in general (Sect. 2) and the Common Criteria in
particular (Sect. 3), we give an overview of the various (formal and informal) specification documents
that are used in a CC evaluation (Sect. 4). We then review case studies in using formal methods for CC
certification at the abstract level (Sect. 5), and we present results of our own investigation based on [9]
into using code-level specification and verification in CC certification (Sect. 6). Finally, we draw con-
clusions from our investigation in Section 7 and show that there still remains a gap between verification
and certification.
2 Software Product Certification
Certification is the assurance of quality properties for a technical entity based on verifiable evidence,
according to well-defined standards, and usually involving an independent third party – the certification
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agency –, while the product’s end-user requires only minimal knowledge of the techniques and tools
used in the certification process itself. There are various reasons to certify software products: Authorities
prescribe certification for legal reasons or reasons of public safety and security. Customers of software
developers ask for certificates because for them software failures are costly, in particular if they integrate
the software into their own products. And finally, certification is a marketing argument as consumers
demand dependable systems.
Improved availability of comprehensive product certification in software engineering would have
considerable advantages. In particular, software engineers have been promoting a paradigm shift from
process- to product-oriented certification for a long time [15, 23]. Software quality assurance should
take a step forward from the “pass/fail” stereotype of normative assurance to a descriptive appearance in
which a certificate describes whether the product “does what one wanted” [24].
3 Common Criteria
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) are an international stan-
dard for the security of software and hardware products established in 1999. It supersedes the previous
standards ITSEC (Europe) and TCSEC (US). The Common Criteria are now officially recognized by
24 countries and are administered by respective domestic authorities, e.g., the Bundesamt für Sicher-
heit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) in Germany. Assessment of products may in turn be delegated to
accredited third-party agencies. For an overview see, e.g., the book by Herrmann [10].
As compared with other certification schemes, the Common Criteria put a strong emphasis on the
validation of the product’s specification. In this sense, they are notably more product-oriented and less
process-oriented than other standards. They clearly distinguish between responsibilities of developers
and evaluators, and they name evaluation deliverables and presentation items which are meant to demon-
strate the claimed properties. Although essentially of strong normative character, the Common Criteria
may also be seen as a step towards a descriptive certification as a description of the product’s security
features is contained in the public document (the Security Target) which is issued alongside a certificate.
There are seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) defined in Common Criteria, where EAL 7
is the strongest. Although commonly misunderstood as a measure of security, EALs are a measure of
assurance quality. They define the degree of rigor and depth that has been applied to assure the claimed
security properties.
4 Formal Specification and Verification in Common Criteria
4.1 Abstract-level Specification and Verification
Assessment at the two highest levels, EAL 6 and 7, requires formal methods – to some extend. These are
primarily found in three documents related to development (apart from development, the CC cover the
whole software life-cycle): the formal security policy model (SPM), the functional specification (FSP),
and the target design presentation (TDS). These documents relate to different levels of abstraction, see
Fig. 1.
Security Policy Model (SPM). The SPM is a, usually product-independent, formalization of the overall
security policy, i.e., it gives a formal definition of what is meant by “security” in the context of the
assessed product. Or, alternatively, SPM is a system invariant which defines a secure state for that
product category. It then has to be shown at the lower abstraction levels that no insecure state is
reachable.
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Dashed arrows ( ) denote a refinement relation.
Solid arrows ( ) denote a proof of correspondence.
(The level of rigor for such proofs depends on the
level of formality of the related models.)
Names on the arrows refer to the assurance package
that includes the proof:
ASE OBJ: Security Objectives
ASE REQ: Security Requirements
ADV FSP: Functional Specification
ADV TDS: Design Description
ADV IMP: Implementation Representation
ADV SPM: Security Policy Model (not shown)
It is not clarified within the CC framework how the
implementation representation as the lowest level of
specification documents relates to the actual imple-
mentation.
Figure 1: Different layers of specification documents that are required at higher-level evaluations (EAL 5
and up).
Functional Specification (FSP). The FSP can be seen as a refinement of the Security Policy Model (SPM).
It addresses single security functions, e.g., access control or event logging. The specifications con-
tained in the FSP are usually formalizations of security functional requirements (SFR), which are
standardized components defined by the Common Criteria written in natural language (see Fig. 2
for an example). The FSP can thus be seen as description of which security functionality is pro-
vided by the product. It then has to be shown that this functionality fulfills the overall policy
defined by the SPM. If both the FSP and the SPM are formal models, this may be done using a
formal proof.
Design Presentation (TDS). The TDS is a model of the implementation design. From EAL 5 on, the
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TDS is required to be written in semi-formal style, i.e., most probably UML class diagrams. At
EAL 7, the TDS has to be complemented by a formal “high-level design presentation”. It is
however not entirely clear where to draw the dividing line between high and low level – thus to
what extend formal methods are to be applied (“high-level” in this context refers to larger sub-
systems, whereas “low-level” refers to the world of single modules or classes). Again, there has to
be a formal proof of correspondence between the formal high-level design model and the formal
functional specification (FSP). These proofs are in practice often considered the main bottleneck
of the Common Criteria – with or without formal methods.
4.2 Code-level Specification and Verification
In fact, the Common Criteria is not concerned with software verification at all. The whole validation
process is instead based on the documents mentioned in Sect. 4.1 above, i.e., an abstract representation
of the implementation at the lowest level. Whether the program code actually conforms to the specified
security functionality is never formally proven. The proponents of the Common Criteria see verification
is as a possible – but complementary or even orthogonal – means to assurance. This has widely provoked
criticism among software engineers as being “testing the paperwork” (e.g. [11]) rather then assessing the
concrete product.
Even though a considerable amount of program testing is mandatory, at neither assurance level test
cases are required to formally relate to the security model or the design specification, i.e., being model-
based or systematically constructed by some other means using information from the (intended) design.
As explained above, all the provided formal models are rather abstract, which makes model-based testing
or even test-case generation difficult. DeLong and Rushby [7] have also shown that the higher the assur-
ance level is, the wider is what they call the “abstraction gap” between the evaluations of specification
documents and the actual product.
5 Previous Work in Abstract-level Formal Methods for CC Certification
Some case studies and real-world certifications using formal methods have been done, though not very
many. The most noteworthy example consists of an implementation of a Java Card Virtual Machine,
which is actually in the field, along with formal specifications [4]. It has been successfully assessed
according to Common Criteria. Although only at EAL 4+1, all formal methods required on EAL 7 have
Figure 2: An example for a standardized generic functional requirement (SFR) and its instantiation: The
SFR “Security Audit Event Selection” as included in Part 2 of the Common Criteria [5, Part 2, Sect. 8.6]
(above); and an instantiation with concrete actions (below). See Section 6 for further discussion of
this SFR.
FAU STG.4: The [security functionality] shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited
events”, “prevent audited events [. . . ]”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] and
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.
FAU STG.4: The [security functionality] shall prevent audited events [. . . ] and notify, for
example by throwing an error message, if the audit trail is full.
1EAL n+ stands for “EAL augmented”, i.e. in addition to all requirements at EAL n, some assurance packages from higher
levels have also been applied.
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been applied. The formal models have been given in terms of Abstract State Machines [3] and consist
of four different machines at the different levels of abstraction, which are refinements of each other: one
for the security objectives, one for the SPM, one for both the FSP and the high-level part of the TDS,
and one for the low-level part of the TDS. While the proof of refinement from functional specification to
design is trivial in this case, the main effort lies in the proof of correspondence between the functional
specification and the security policy model.
In a similar, more academic, case study [16] on Java Card technology, all specifications are given in
the form of B machines [1] (except for the semi-formal low-level design description, which is written
in UML). Again, these machines are proven to be refinements of each other.
In the certification effort by Woodcock et al. [21, 26] – possibly the most well known – the Mondex
electronic purse smart card was successfully assessed at ITSEC level E6, which may be compared to
EAL 7. Specifications are given in the Z specification language [25]; proofs were done with pen and
paper.
All these works profit from a well-defined formal notion of refinement in the respective specification
formalism. But, in neither case, source code has been investigated, although all papers name this to be
the next important step in a successful thorough evaluation.
There are also projects in which real-world software is verified “in a strong certification context”,
such as Verisoft [22] or L4.verified [12]. While they were successful in verification, their products are
yet to be certified.
6 A Case Study in Code-level Specification and Verification
As said above, the original certification of the Mondex electronic purse did not include program verifica-
tion. This was the starting point of a verification challenge which was taken on by several groups [8, 17,
19, 20]. Schmitt and Tonin [20] reimplemented the Mondex protocol in Java Card and added code-level
specifications on the basis of the Z specification by Woodcock et al. [21] (the publicly available Z specifi-
cation is not the original one used in the actual certification). These code-level specifications are written
in the Java Modeling Language (JML) [13], a widely used all-purpose specification language based on
the design-by-contract paradigm and written directly into source files as comments. Schmitt and Tonin
have also formally verified functional correctness of the implementation using the KeY tool [2]. We will
discuss an excerpt from the specification below.
Based on this work, we have investigated how formal specification and verification relates to the
different requirements of the CC and how code-level specification and verification may be used in a real
world certification process.
As the implementation is not part of the hierarchy of formal CC documents, we instead begin with
the implementation representation (IMP). It shall “capture the detailed internal workings”, as defined
in [5, Part 1, Sect. 4.1]. The main goal here is to ensure that the security functionality, which is described
in a higher level of the design, is actually implemented. Of course, this assurance – if required to be of
a formal kind – can only be made in a sound way if the program code is verified. In fact, code-level
specification may readily be used as an implementation representation, provided that it covers the full
functional behavior of a module or method.
In the example in Fig. 3, the method abort_if_necessary watches over the event log of the card.
Normally all events are logged and the system changes its internal state. The more interesting case
is when the logging capacities are exhausted, which is indicated by the index reaching the boundary
exLog.length (Line 3). In this exceptional case the method is expected to terminate abruptly by throw-
ing an exception (Line 5) while the index and internal state are kept in their current state (Lines 7–8).
Other sources of exceptional behavior are ruled out (Lines 4 and 6).
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Figure 3: Code-level specifications in JML (Mondex case study)
1 /*@ public exceptional_behavior
2 @ requires (status == Epv || status == Epa) &&
3 @ logIdx == exLog.length;
4 @ signals_only ISOException;
5 @ signals (ISOException e)
6 @ e.getReason () == SW_LOG_FULL &&
7 @ \old(logIdx) == logIdx &&
8 @ \old(status) == status;
9 @*/
10 private void abort_if_necessary () throws ISOException;
At the next higher level is a design description (TDS) of the system. In the TDS, the product is
decomposed into sub-systems and modules. In our example, a module corresponds to a single Java
method and sub-systems correspond to collections of methods. While sub-systems have to be modelled
formally at EAL 7, this is not required for modules:2
ADV TDS.5.7C: The design shall provide a semiformal description of each module in terms
of its purpose, interaction, interfaces, return values from those interfaces, and called inter-
faces to other modules, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
It is, of course, not illegal to use a formal specification at module level, thus the above code-level speci-
fications might also qualify as a design description as well. If needed, semiformal documents like class
diagrams can be derived from the given Java class structure. As another opportunity, the required “infor-
mal, explanatory text” could be derived through automated translation of formal specifications to natural
language.
A further level of abstraction is the functional specification (FSP). It is meant to reflect the functional
requirements (SFR) in a formal style. This correspondence has to be demonstrated by a “rigorous argu-
ment” in CC jargon. Recall the example consisting of the requirements given in Fig. 2 and the code-level
specification in Fig. 3). The specification states that, in case of a full log (or “audit trail”), no event
occurs (as this would mean changing the state) and this situation is signalled through means of a thrown
exception. It remains to show, however, that all audited events occur within the scope of that method. Fi-
nally, the CC require a formal proof of correspondence between the design description and the functional
specification. In this case this is trivial since both have the same model.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is theoretically possible to use code-level specifications as develop-
ment models in the Common Criteria. However, they are not required, and whether they are adequate
in real-world certification will depend on the evaluator. The standard itself tends to be very vague on
how formal methods are used. In our opinion it is also possible to replace functional testing by formal
verification altogether even if verification is not required explicitly.
While it is clear that most security policies are only expressible at a high level of abstraction, they
are only enforceable if there is a sound trail of evidence, tracing from the abstract-level specification to
the implementation. If the principal goal of the CC for high-assurance reliably secure software is to be
reached, certification has to include state-of-the-art verification techniques.
2Cf. [5, Part 3, Sect. 12.6.1, p. 113]
6
Mind the Gap: Formal Verification and the Common Criteria Beckert, Bruns, and Grebing
We are not aiming at the creation of an even higher assurance level beyond EAL 7. This would bear
the risk of even lowering the overall acceptance of formal verification in the industry. Statistics [6] show
that of over a thousand certified products, the vast majority has reached EAL 4+ or below, while EAL 5
is at least quite common for smart cards and their applications. Only three hardware devices and no
software products were awarded EAL 6 or higher until now. This shows that hopes for a broader usage
of formal methods through means of the Common Criteria were not fulfilled. And even in academic
contexts, there are few results. As explained in the work by Chetali and Nguyen [4], reaching an actual
certification is far more work-intensive, and verification is just a fraction of that. In the end, they reached
only EAL 4+. A full EAL 7 evaluation would also require other laborious tasks such as integration and
penetration tests.
In the end, achieving wide-spread use of formal methods in certification requires changes to the
CC itself. And that is to a great extend a political question. The possibility to include verification in the
up-coming Version 4 of the CC (to be finalized end-2010) has been discussed within the CC community,
cf. [14], but the central aim of the new revision seems to be at the opposite end: to lower requirements
for the lower assurance levels. This situation is similar with the international standard DO-178B [18] for
the safety certification of avionics software. It does not provide guidance on how to use formal methods
(neither for the development nor the certification of software). Fortunately, revision of the DO-178B
standard is discussed at the moment which – it is hoped – will lead to an increased use of formal methods
in the certification process.
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